High Seas Tragedy: Lion Air Crash Victims’ Families Face Limited Compensation
In re Lion Air Flight JT 610 Crash, 110 F.4th 1007 (7th Cir. 2024)
The In re Lion Air Flight JT 610 Crash case arises from the tragic crash of Lion Air Flight JT 610, which resulted in the deaths of all passengers and crew. The plaintiffs, representing the estates of the deceased, sought damages for pain and suffering under state and general maritime law. The plaintiffs also sought compensation for property lost during the crash, which occurred over the high seas.
The central legal issue before the appellate court was whether the plaintiffs’ claims for pain, suffering, and property loss could proceed under state and general maritime law or if these claims were preempted by the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA). DOHSA, a federal statute, governs wrongful death claims arising from accidents that occur more than three nautical miles from shore and typically limits recovery to pecuniary damages, excluding claims for pain and suffering.
The court held that DOHSA preempted all other wrongful death remedies that would have been available under state law and general maritime law, limiting recovery to pecuniary losses. This meant that the plaintiffs could not recover damages for the decedents’ pain and suffering or for their lost property. The court further ruled that claims brought under DOHSA must proceed in admiralty jurisdiction, and plaintiffs are not entitled to a jury trial in such cases. As a result, the plaintiffs were limited to seeking compensation only for the financial losses caused by the deaths of their relatives.
The court’s decision reaffirmed DOHSA’s broad preemption of state and general maritime remedies in cases involving wrongful death on the high seas and clarified that federal admiralty law, not state law, governs these claims. Additionally, the ruling reinforced the procedural limitation that DOHSA claims must be tried without a jury in federal court.
Court Denies Seaman Status to Offshore Worker in Jones Act Claim
Edwards v. Intermoor, Inc., No. 23-30727, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 22010 (5th Cir. Aug. 29, 2024).
In Edwards v. Intermoor, Inc., the appellate court dealt with issue surrounding the Jones Act and the seaman status of a worker. Lawrence Edwards, the plaintiff, brought a suit against Intermoor, Inc. and Tidewater Marine, L.L.C. after being injured while working on a vessel. Edwards sought to recover under the Jones Act, which provides protections for seamen injured in the course of their employment. However, the key legal issue in this case was whether Edwards qualified as a “seaman” under the Chandris test, which defines seaman status.
The Chandris test requires two criteria to be met for an individual to qualify as a seaman: (1) the worker’s duties must contribute to the function of a vessel or the accomplishment of its mission, and (2) the worker must have a connection to a vessel in navigation (or an identifiable group of vessels) that is substantial in both its duration and nature. Edwards argued that his work met these requirements and that he had a…
