Yacht Damage Claim Capsizes Over Broker’s Role
TWC Acqua Ltd. v. RFIB Grp. Ltd., No. 23-12100, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 28292 (11th
Cir. Nov. 7, 2024)
In TWC Acqua Ltd. v. RFIB Group Ltd., the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a dispute between TWC Acqua Limited (TWC) and RFIB Group Limited (RFIB) concerning a marine insurance policy. TWC, the owner of the M/Y Acqua, filed a breach of contract claim against RFIB, alleging that RFIB failed to indemnify it for water damage to the yacht caused by heavy rains while docked in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, in 2017. TWC sought compensation under a marine insurance policy that it purchased through RFIB, which was designated as the broker, not the insurer.
The district court granted TWC’s motion for a default judgment on liability after RFIB failed to respond to the complaint on time. RFIB subsequently appeared, arguing that it was not liable under the policy because it was merely a broker and not an insurer. RFIB further contended that the insurance contract unambiguously designated three Lloyd’s Syndicates as the underwriters responsible for indemnification, not RFIB. Despite these arguments, the district court maintained its judgment, prompting RFIB to appeal.
The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s decision, ruling that the lower court abused its discretion by granting the default judgment without properly assessing whether TWC’s complaint stated a plausible claim for breach of contract. The appellate court emphasized that a motion for default judgment requires the plaintiff’s allegations to meet the pleading standards established in Twombly and Iqbal. Here, the insurance policy clearly identified RFIB as a broker rather than an insurer, making TWC’s allegations of breach of contract implausible. The court also found that the district court erred in implicitly construing RFIB as a liable insurer despite the unambiguous terms of the policy.
TWC argued that ambiguities in the policy justified the default judgment, but the
Eleventh Circuit disagreed. The court held that the policy explicitly differentiated
between RFIB’s role as a broker and the underwriters’ role as insurers. Accordingly, RFIB could not be held liable for indemnification. The appellate court vacated the default judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss TWC’s complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim.
Land-Based Trip Sinks Seaman’s Unseaworthiness Claim
Sanders v. Weeks Marine, Inc., No. 23-cv-7317, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176748 (E.D.
La. Sept. 27, 2024)
The plaintiff, Pedro Sanders, filed a personal injury lawsuit under the Jones Act against his employer, Weeks Marine, Inc., following a trip-and-fall accident on November 8, 2022. Sanders alleged that he was injured while retrieving supplies from a shack at a worksite. He claimed to have tripped over a D-ring, which should have been buried but was exposed, resulting in serious injuries. His claims included negligence under the Jones Act, unseaworthiness, and maintenance and cure, as well as compensatory damages for mental anguish, pain and suffering, and bodily impairment.
Weeks Marine moved for partial summary judgment, seeking dismissal of Sanders’ claims for nonpecuniary damages and unseaworthiness. Additionally, the defendant filed motions to exclude the testimony of two of Sanders’ expert witnesses: safety expert Robert Borison and economic loss expert Max Lummis.
The court granted Weeks Marine’s motion for partial summary judgment on nonpecuniary damages. It ruled that under maritime law, Jones Act seamen cannot recover nonpecuniary damages, such as mental anguish or bodily impairment, except as related to maintenance and cure claims. Regarding unseaworthiness, the court found that the accident occurred on land and that there was no evidence linking the alleged hazard to a vessel’s condition, crew, or appurtenances. As a result, the unseaworthiness claim was also dismissed.
Weeks Marine’s motions to exclude expert testimony were partially granted. The court excluded Borison’s opinions, ruling that his testimony on tripping hazards was unnecessary because the issues in the case were within the common understanding of lay jurors. Lummis’ economic calculations for future lost wages were excluded because they improperly accounted for inflation. However, the court allowed Lummis 14 days…
